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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 981539-CA
Priority No. 2

RAYMOND RICK LYMAN,
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant/appellant Raymond Rick Lyman appeals from afinaljudgment of conviction
entered on August 4, 1998, in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, Utah,
arising from defendant's conditional plea of "no contest" (nolo contendere) to one count of
Lewdness, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702 (1953, as
amended). Pursuant to Rule 1 l(i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant
reserved his right, on the record, to review the trial court's denial of his Motion to Dismiss the
Information. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a3(2)(e) (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Statement of the Issues
1. Whether defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Information should have been granted

voyeurism by an individual on his or her own property?

his or her own property, is void for vagueness as applied, and, therefore, violates due process
under the United States and Utah constitutions because it does not provide adequate notice as to
prohibited?
Standard of Review

deference to the trial court's determinations. State v. Gallegos, 941 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah Ct. App.
1997), cert granted, 945 I 2d 1118 ( [ Jtal i 199 1 ).

' .': " '"

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Case
• 1 his is ai I a ppeal ft oi n a coi I ictioi i dated \:t ign ist < 1 1998 in i till: le I 'if til: I Ji idicial District
Court, in and for Iron County, Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding. Pursuant to a plea
agreemeni . . defendant entered a plea of " i 10I0 coi itei idei e" il: ::i :: i i = c :)i u: it of I ew dness oi i J i lb
1

* *s -

r

his charge arose from an official investigation into complaints the defendant peeked at

disrobed and partially disrobed females in a tanning room located at a health club of which the
defendant is part owner. To avoid detection, the defendant secreted himself in a maintenance
closet which shared a common wall with the tanning room. This common wall contained a hole

On August 3, 1998, Judge Eves sentenced the defendant to a six-month term of
incarceration in the Iron County Correctional Facility, and assessed a one-thousand dollar fine,

-2-

plus an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge against the defendant. The trial court stayed the
execution of that sentence, and placed the defendant on twelve months bench probation,
incorporating various conditions for that probation.
Defendant now seeks to overturn his conviction on the grounds "trespassory
voyeurism" requires a property trespass, and that his co-ownership of the health club negates the
trespass element. In addition, the defendant claims that, if "trespassory voyeurism" is interpreted
to not require a trespass, the statute is void for vagueness as applied to the present case, as the
defendant did not have notice that voyeurism without a trespass was prohibited.
The State of Utah asserts the phrase "trespassory voyeurism" does not require an
individual to trespass on real property. Rather, "trespassory voyeurism" refers to the nonconsensual observation of another individual in various stages of undress, regardless of property
ownership. Moreover, this interpretation of "trespassory voyeurism" does not violate an
individual's rights to due process, in that the term "voyeurism" does not necessarily presume an
invasion of privacy. Furthermore, even if the Court were to find the terms "trespassory
voyeurism" void for vagueness in the present case, the remaining provisions of U.C. A. § 76-9-702
prohibit the defendant's observation of the women in the tanning room.
Furthermore, in American Fork City v. Carr, 358 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah Ct. App.
1998), a panel of this Court has already held that a physical trespass is not required to establish
the offense "trespassory voyeurism." Therefore, the issue on which defendant challenges the trial
court's denial of his Motion to Dismiss and subsequent conviction has already been decided by
this Court. The State asserts this Court ruled correctly on this issue, and the principles and
purposes of stare decisis require this Court to apply that interpretation in the present case.
-3-

2. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
On December 18, 1996, the State of Utah filed an Information against the defendant,
alleging five (5) counts of Lewdness, each a class B misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 76-9-702 (1953, as amended). These charges arose out of concerns recounted to
law enforcement regarding the defendant's behavior at the LifePhase Health Center.
Pursuant to an investigation of the matter, officers with the Cedar City Police
Department discovered the defendant exhibited the pattern of entering the club's maintenance
closet when particular women entered the tanning room. Upon inspection, the officers observed a
hole in a wall within the maintenance closet. This hole gave visual access to the tanning room,
and any occupants which entered the tanning room. Therefore, the officers placed a surveillance
camera in the maintenance closet to capture the defendant's movements upon entering the closet.
Subsequently, officers learned the surveillance equipment had been removed from the
maintenance closet.
Thereafter, the officers spoke with the defendant, and various other individuals,
including health club employees. Based on that information, the defendant was charged in an
Information with one Count of Theft, a third-degree felony, and five counts of Lewdness, each a
class B misdemeanor. On June 12, 1996, Judge Robert T. Braithwaite of the Fifth District Court
bound the defendant over on all counts alleged in the Information. However, on November 27,
1996, in response to defendant's Motion to Quash Bind-Over Order, Judge J. Philip Eves
dismissed the five Lewdness counts without prejudice to refiling. The State filed a new
Information, re-alleging the five Lewdness counts, on December 18, 1996.
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In response to the State's Information alleging five counts of Lewdness, on August 25,
1997, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Information. Defendant's motion was based on the
language in U.C. A. § 76-9-702 relating to "trespassory voyeurism." Judge Eves addressed and
denied that motion in a Memorandum Decision filed on January 22, 1998. Subsequently,
pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant entered a plea of "nolo contendere" to one count of
Lewdness on July 23, 1998. On August 3, 1998, Judge Eves sentenced the defendant to a sixmonth term of incarceration in the Iron County Correctional Facility, and assessed a one-thousand
dollar fine, plus an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge against the defendant. The trial court
stayed the execution of that sentence, and placed the defendant on twelve months bench
probation, incorporating various conditions for that probation.
3. Statement of the Facts
The LifePhase Fitness Center [hereinafter "LifePhase"] is a privately-owned athletic
facility in Cedar City, Utah. This facility is co-owned and operated by Steve Brown and the
defendant, Raymond Rick Lyman. On April 1, 1996, Paula Douglas, a LifePhase patron,
informed Cedar City Police Officer Kelvin Minefee of her suspicion someone was secretly
observing her as she used the LifePhase tanning bed. It was Ms. Douglas' further statement she
was typically nude when using the tanning bed.
After receiving this report, Officer Minefee contacted Detective Kenneth Stapley of the
Cedar City Police Department, who in turn approached Mr. Brown. Detective Stapley requested,
and received, permission from Mr. Brown to examine the LifePhase building. Specifically,
Detective Stapley inspected the LifePhase tanning room and maintenance closet. Upon inspecting
the maintenance closet, Detective Stapley located a small hole, approximately one and one-half
-5-

inches (IVi") in width by three inches (3H) in height. This hole permitted observation directly into
the LifePhase tanning room.
With the further consent of Mr. Brown, Detectives Stapley and Roy Houchen installed
video equipment, including a VCR, monitor, and small camera, in the maintenance room in an
attempt to identify any individual(s) who might be using the hole to observe patrons using the
tanning room.
Detective Stapley entered LifePhase on April 6, 1996, prior to the facility opening for
business that day, to activate the surveillance equipment. Thereafter, Detective Stapley returned
to the facility at 7:00 p.m. to remove the equipment. Upon arriving, Detective Stapley discovered
the surveillance equipment was missing, and also noticed the hole in the wall common to the
maintenance closet and the tanning room had been covered over with spackle.
Subsequently, Detective Stapley responded to the defendant's residence to ascertain
where the equipment was, and to demand its return. The defendant disavowed any knowledge of
the equipment's location, and further denied covering the hole in the maintenance closet wall with
spackle. In maintaining his lack of involvement, the defendant claimed he had not entered the
LifePhase maintenance closet on April 6, 1996. In addition, the defendant asserted he did not
leave the LifePhase premises during the day of April 6, 1996. Subsequently, the defendant
recanted his statement he had not left LifePhase during the day, and stated he had actually left
LifePhase several times during the day of April 6, 1996.
Purusuant to his investigation, Detective Stapley interviewed employees and other
individuals who were present at LifePhase on April 6, 1996. Among those individuals interviewed
by Detective Stapley was Chris Delahunty, who was installing carpet at LifePhase on April 6,
-6-

1996. Mr. Delahunty advised Detective Stapley the defendant approached Mr. Delahunty on
April 6, 1996, to request the use of Mr. Delahunty's putty knife. Mr. Delahunty further advised
Detective Stapley that the defendant had a one-gallon bucket of drywall repair spackle in his hand
as he requested the putty knife.
In addition, Detective Stapley interviewed Paula Douglas, who was using the tanning
room on April 6, 1996. Ms. Douglas informed the detective that she arrived at LifePhase at
approximately 9:30 a.m., and noticed the defendant was present. At approximately 10:00 a.m.,
Ms. Douglas attempted to locate the defendant to receive a tanning pass, and she found the
defendant near the maintenance closet. At that time, Ms. Douglas received a pass, and
determined she was the first individual to use the tanning room that morning because a new
"cleaning sticker" appeared on the bed. Ms. Douglas informed Detective Stapley that she
believed she heard someone in the maintenance closet after she entered the tanning room. When
her tanning session ended, Ms. Douglas attempted to locate the defendant, but could not find the
defendant within the LifePhase facility. She proceeded to the parking lot, and discovered the
defendant's vehicle was no longer parked outside. Ms. Douglas informed Detective Stapley that
no other owners or managers were at LifePhase at that time, and that the facility was therefore
left unattended.
Thereafter, on April 23, 1996, Detective Stapley interviewed Amy Peterson, who was a
LifePhase employee. Ms. Peterson advised the detective she had personal knowledge the
defendant was "peeping" on women as they would enter the tanning room, and that this was
ongoing behavior. Additionally, Ms. Peterson informed the detective she began maintaining a
record of dates and times when the defendant would enter the maintenance room to view females
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as they would tan in the tanning bed. Ms. Peterson drew the conclusion the defendant was
observing these females because the defendant would inexplicably "disappear" when certain
women came to LifePhase to use the tanning room, and Ms. Peterson would then learn the
defendant was in the maintenance closet for the duration of those tanning sessions.
Based on that information, the defendant was charged in an Information with one Count
of Theft, a third-degree felony, and five counts of Lewdness, each a class B misdemeanor. On
June 12, 1996, Judge Robert T. Braithwaite of the Fifth District Court bound the defendant over
on all counts alleged in the Information. However, on November 27, 1996, in response to
defendant's Motion to Quash Bind-Over Order, Judge J. Philip Eves dismissed the five Lewdness
counts without prejudice to refiling. The State filed a new Information, re-alleging the five
Lewdness counts, on December 18, 1996.
In response to the State's Information alleging five counts of Lewdness, on August 25,
1997, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Information. Defendant's motion was based on the
language in U.C.A. § 76-9-702 relating to "trespassory voyeurism." Judge Eves addressed and
denied that motion in a Memorandum Decision filed on January 22, 1998. Subsequently,
pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant entered a plea of "nolo contendere" to one count of
Lewdness on July 23, 1998. On August 3, 1998, Judge Eves sentenced the defendant to a sixmonth term of incarceration in the Iron County Correctional Facility, and assessed a one-thousand
dollar fine, plus an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge against the defendant. The trial court
stayed the execution of that sentence, and placed the defendant on twelve months bench
probation, incorporating various conditions for that probation.
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RELEVANT STATUTE
Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-702:
(1) A person is guilty of lewdness if the person under
circumstances not amounting to rape, object rape, forcible sodomy,
forcible sexual abuse, aggravated sexual assault, or an attempt to
commit any of these offenses, performs an act of sexual intercourse
or sodomy, exposes his or her geuit&ls or private parts,
masturbates, engages in trespassory voyeurism, or performs any
other act of lewdness in a public place or under circumstances
which the person should know will likely cause affront or alarm to,
on, or in the presence of another who is 14 years of age or older.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
An individual may engage in "trespassory voyeurism" regardless of a proprietary
interest in the location where the act occurs. Specifically, an individual may be convicted of
"trespassory voyeurism" when that act took place on his or her own property. In the context of
U.C.A. § 76-9-702, the term "trespassory" does not refer to an invasion of real property, but
rather to an invasion of privacy. This interpretation is supported by the fact the word
"voyeurism" does not necessarily imply an invasion of privacy.
In addition, to interpret the terms "trespassory voyeurism" otherwise (i.e., as
sanctioning an invasion of privacy provided the invasion occurs on the actor's own property),
would render the remaining provisions of the statute incongruous.
Furthermore, even if the Court were to hold the terms "trespassory voyeurism" void for
vagueness, the act defendant was convicted of is proscribed by other language contained in
U.C.A. § 76-9-702.
Moreover, a panel of this Court held that a physical trespass is not required to establish
the offense "trespassory voyeurism." Therefore, the issue on which defendant challenges the trial
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court's denial of his Motion to Dismiss and subsequent conviction has already been decided by
this Court. The State asserts this Court ruled correctly on this issue, and the principles and
purposes of stare decisis require this Court to apply that interpretation in the present case.
ARGUMENT
1.

THE PHRASE "TRESPASSORY VOYEURISM" AS USED IN THE
LEWDNESS STATUTE SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO PROHIBIT
VOYEURISM BY AN INDIVIDUAL ON HIS OR HER OWN
PROPERTY.

In American Fork City v. Carr, 358 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this
Court addressed the issue of whether "trespassory voyeurism" requires a physical trespass onto
real property. In determining a physical trespass was not required, this Court held:
Under the plain meaning of the terms [trespassory voyeurism]... a
person engages in trespassory voyeurism by deriving sexual
gratification from observing the sex organs or sex acts of someone
who has a reasonable expectation of privacy. . . .Thus, contrary to
defendant's claim, the phrase trespassory voyeurism does not
require proof that defendant trespassed on real property.
American Fork City v. Carr, 358 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. While the State asserts this Court ruled
correctly on this issue, and the analysis contained in American Fork City v. Carr should be applied
to the instant case, for purposes of this brief, the State will respond to each of defendant's
challenges in turn.
Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.) defines the term "voyeurism" as "the condition of one
who derives sexual satisfaction from observing the sexual organs or acts of others, generally from
a secret vantage point." This term is defined similarly in Webster's II New College Dictionary
(1995), which defines "voyeur" as "[o]ne who derives sexual gratification from observing the sex
organs or sexual acts of others, especially] from a secret vantage point." See also American Fork
-10-

City v. Carr. 358 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. Interestingly, neither definition requires the voyeurism to
occur without the consent of the individual being observed. Indeed, the act of viewing another
individual in various stages of undress is not a criminal act per se.
This assertion is supported by the fact many forms of "entertainment," such as movies,
magazines, and other medium, present material to the general public which would satiate
voyeuristic tendencies, yet are not illegal in nature. For example, the distribution of pornographic
material is prohibited by U.C.A. § 76-10-1204 (1953, as amended). However, this statute does
not proscribe the simple possession of pornographic material, unless the individual possessing the
material intends to distribute or exhibit the material to others. And, material is described as being
"pornographic" if:
(a) The average person, applying contemporary community
standards, finds that, taken as a whole, it appeals to prurient interest
in sex;
(b) It is patently offensive in the description or depiction of nudity,
sexual conduct, sexual excitement, sadomasochistic abuse, or
excretion; and
(c) Taken as a whole it does not have serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
U.C.A. § 76-10-1203 (1953, as amended).
Clearly, given the definition of "voyeurism" as the state of one who obtains sexual
gratification from observing the sexual organs or acts of others, ordinarily from a secret vantage
point, the possession and examination of pornographic material (i.e., material which appeals to a
prurient interest in sex, and which describes or depicts nudity, sexual conduct, and the like) may
be classified as voyeurism. Therefore, it is the State's position that, given the fact the term
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"voyeurism" does not imply non-consensual behavior, the Legislature necessarily included the
term "trespassory" to distinguish the behavior it sought to prohibit.
"Trespass" has been variously defined as "[a]n unlawful interference with one's person,
property, or rights" Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.), and "go[ing] beyond the limits of what is
considered right; do[ing] wrong; transgressing]". Webster's New World Dictionary (1982).
Given the fact the term "voyeurism" is not in and of itself criminal activity, the inclusion of
"trespassory" differentiates the act as an invasion of another's privacy rights, thereby rendering
the voyeurism illegal.
This interpretation of "trespassory voyeurism" is in accord with the rules of statutory
construction. Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court held:
A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are to
be construed according to their plain language. . . . Only if the
language of a statute is ambiguous do we resort to other modes of
construction. . . . Furthermore, unambiguous language may not be
interpreted to contradict its plain meaning. . . . A corollary of this
rule is that "a statutory term should be interpreted and applied
according to its usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary
meaning of the term results in an application that is neither
unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of
the express purpose of the statute."
O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). See
also State v. 1.37 Acres of Real Property. 886 P.2d 534, 537 (Utah 1994); quoting Savage
Indus.. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991) ("In construing a statute,
we assume that 'each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus, the statutory words are read
literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable.'").
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It is the State's position the phrase "trespassory voyeurism" has a reasonable degree of
common understanding within the community, and therefore warrants a literal interpretation.
However, this Court has held that, in cases where the statutory terms are not susceptible to a plain
meaning construction (i.e., the terms are ambiguous), those terms should derive their meaning
from the context in which they occur . See Mariemont v. White City Water Imp. Dist.. 958 P.2d
222, 224-25 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Vogt 824 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In
addition, in resolving any ambiguity statutory terms may raise, this Court held:
[W]e adhere to the prinicple that "[a] statute is passed as a whole
and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose
and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed
in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a
harmonious whole. Thus, it is not proper to confine interpretation
to the one section to be construed. . . . [W]hen interpreting a
statute all parts must be construed together without according
undue importance to a single or isolated portion."
State v. Redd. 954 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), quoting 2A Norman J. Singer,
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05, at 103 (5th ed. 1992).
Furthermore, when construing the ambiguous terms of a statute, c"[i]t is axiomatic that
a statute should be given a reasonable and sensible construction and that the legislature did not
intend an absurd or unreasonable result.'" Thornock v. Jensen. 950 P.2d 441, 444 (Utah 1997).
It is apparent the Legislature, by including the term "trespassory," intended to prohibit a
specific type of voyeurism; that is, to proscribe non-consensual voyeurism. To interpret the
phrase "trespassory voyeurism" otherwise would result in a pronouncement it is permissible to
view an individual in various stages of undress, regardless of whether that observation is
consensual. For example, to interpret "trespassory voyeurism" as requiring a physical trespass on
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another individual's real property, hotel owners, as well as hotel patrons, who are lawfully located
in a particular area of the hotel, would be permitted to drill holes through common walls to
observe neighboring individuals with impunity. The State asserts this interpretation of
"trespassory voyeurism" is not reasonable, is not sensible, and would imply the legislature
intended an absurd result.
Therefore, the State avers "trespassory voyeurism" refers to the non-consensual
observation of another individual's sexual organs or sexual acts for the purpose of obtaining
sexual gratification, regardless of where that voyeurism occurs. This definition is supported by
the plain meaning of the phrase "trespassory voyeurism," as well as from the context in which that
phrase appears in the Lewdness statute.
2.

UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE LEWDNESS STATUTE IS
NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS IF IT IS INTERPRETED TO NOT
REQUIRE A PROPERTY TRESPASS.

When questioning the validity of a statute, courts grant legislative enactments a
presumption of constitutionality. See State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 927 (Utah Ct. App.
1991); citing Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991).1 In
addressing this presumption, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically considered the "void for
vagueness" doctrine, which requires:
[T]hat a statute or ordinance define an "offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. . . . More important than actual notice

1

See also City of St. George v. Turner, 860 P.2d 929, 936 (Utah 1993) ("The
established rule of construction of legislative enactments is that they should be construed to be
constitutional whenever possible."); Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah
1990) ("We have a duty to construe statutes to avoid constitutional conflicts.").
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is "'the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines
to govern law enforcement.'" . . . "It is a basic principle of due
process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions
are not clearly defined."
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted).
This Court has held that, when challenging a statute's constitutionality on a void-forvagueness basis, the challenge may proceed either as a facial challenge, or a challenge in the
statute's application. See State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The defendant's
motion appears to challenge the Lewdness statute in its application. However, for purposes of this
brief, the State will address both a facial challenge, as well as a challenge to application of the
statute to the defendant's acts.
It is well-settled in Utah that a statute will be found facially invalid only if that statute is
"'incapable of any valid application.'" Greenwood, 817 P.2d at 819. Specifically, the Utah
Supreme Court has held:
We will find a statute to be unconstitutionally vague on its face only
when it is insufficiently explicit and clear to inform the ordinary
reader of common intelligence what conduct is proscribed. . . . We
apply this test in light of the fact that exactitude of language is
seldom possible. Consequently, we will not invalidate a statute for
vagueness if any sensible, practical effect can be given to the
contested statutory terms.
Zissi v. State Tax Com'n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848, 854 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted).
In challenging a statute on its face, it is incumbent upon the defendant to establish the
statute is "invalid in toto and therefore incapable of any valid application. . . ." Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474, 39 L.Ed.2d 505, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1223 (1974). In other words, as
held by the United States Supreme Court, "[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course,
the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set
-15-

of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 745, 95 L.Ed.2d 697, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987) (emphasis added).
With respect to the Lewdness statute, in particular the phrase "trespassory voyeurism,"
the State asserts this phrase is sufficiently clear to inform an individual of common intelligence
what type of behavior is prohibited. Certainly the general public is aware they are not entitled to
surreptitiously observe activities which have been relegated to private quarters. Any other
interpretation of the statute would permit an individual who is properly within a hotel room to drill
a hole through their neighbor's wall and observe those private activities with impunity.
After determining a statute is facially valid, the next analysis requires a determination of
whether the statute is vague in its application to the facts of a particular case. Clearly, an
individual who feels it necessary to conceal himself in a private closet to observe another's sexual
organs is on notice the behavior he is engaged in is criminal. Furthermore, the defendant's actions
upon finding the surveillance equipment (i.e., removing the surveillance equipment and spackling
the hole) demonstrate the defendant knew his behavior was criminal, thereby establishing the
defendant had sufficient notice for purposes of a void-for-vagueness challenge.
Therefore, the State asserts that, inasmuch as the phrase "trespassory voyeurism" is
susceptible to a literal reading, that phrase was defined in the statute with sufficient definiteness to
apprise the defendant of what conduct the statute proscribed. However, even if this Court were to
find that the phrase cannot be interpreted or applied in accord with its commonly understood
meaning, the context in which "trespassory voyeurism" appears, and the fact the defendant deemed
it necessary to closet himself in a maintenance room to accomplish his observation of the females
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in the tanning room, evidences the defendant was provided with adequate notice his behavior was
in violation of the Lewdness statute.
3.

THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED
EVEN IF THE STATUTE IS HELD TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
VAGUE IN ITS APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

Even if this Court were to hold the phrase "trespassory voyeurism" unconstitutionally
vague in its application, the State avers the defendant's behavior is proscribed by the remaining
provisions of U.C.A. § 76-9-702. The Lewdness statute, in pertinent part, prohibits "any other
act of lewdness in a public place, or under circumstances which the person should know will likely
cause affront or alarm to, on, or in the presence of another who is 14 years of age or older."
Therefore, the statute prohibits conduct which the offender should know would cause
the victim to feel offended or alarmed. Doubtless, individuals securing themselves in private
rooms in an attempt to bar others from observing them in various stages of undress would be
offended or alarmed to learn another individual had observed them by watching them through a
hole in the wall. In fact, as held by a Ninth Circuit Court,
We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of privacy than the
naked body. The desire to shield one's unclothed figure from view
of strangers, particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled
by elementary self-respect and personal dignity.
York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963), cert, denied 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
In the present case, the defendant observed various females as they used the tanning
room at LifePhase without the women's consent. In order to tan, these women disrobed, and the
defendant observed them from a concealed vantage point. Upon suspecting she was being
watched as she tanned, Paula Douglas was upset and concerned, so she contacted the Cedar City
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Police Department. Clearly, the behavior the defendant engaged in caused Ms. Douglas, as well
as the other females the defendant observed, to feel alarmed and affronted.
Therefore, because the defendant violated the terms of the statute relating to
"trespassory voyeurism," as well as other express provisions of the Lewdness statute, the Motion
to Dismiss Information was properly denied, and the defendant's subsequent conviction should
not be reversed.
4.

THE CASE OF AMERICAN FORK v. CARR WAS CORRECTLY
DECIDED AND SHOULD BE FOLLOWED.

In American Fork City v. Cam 358 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), a panel of
this Court addressed the issue of whether "trespassory voyeurism" requires a physical trespass
onto real property. In determining a physical trespass was not required, this Court held:
Under the plain meaning of the terms [trespassory voyeurism]... a
person engages in trespassory voyeurism by driving sexual
gratification from observing the sex organs or sex acts of someone
who has a reasonable expectation of privacy. . . .Thus, contrary to
defendant's claim, the phrase trespassory voyeurism does not
require proof that defendant trespassed on real property.
American Fork City v. Cam 358 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. The State asserts the Court ruled
correctly on this issue, and the principles and purposes of stare decisis require this Court to apply
that interpretation in the present case.
The facts underlying American Fork City v. Carr involved trespassory voyeurism in a
public restroom. Specifically, in that case, the defendant ("Carr") was located in a bathroom stall
in a public restroom, and was discovered peeking at the victim located in an adjacent stall. The
victim advised law enforcement of Carr's activity, and Carr was thereafter cited for lewdness.
Carr filed a Motion to Dismiss at the trial court level, requesting a dismissal on grounds
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"trespassory voyeurism" requires a trespass onto real property. The trial court denied Carr's
motion, and a panel of this Court affirmed the trial court's denial.
With respect to the issue of stare decisis, the Utah Supreme Court held that "[u]nder the
doctrine of stare decisis, once a point of law is decided, that ruling should be followed by a court
of the same rank or a lower rank in subsequent cases confronting the same legal issue." State v.
Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995), citing 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 183 (1965)
(emphasis added). Indeed, to argue the decision of one panel is not binding on other panels is "to
disregard the nature of the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction, the manner in which it must act, and the
necessity for uniformity and predictability in the law established by the panels of the Court of
Appeals." Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons. 904 P.2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995).
Among the purposes to be served in requiring courts of equal rank to adhere to the
principle of stare decisis is the need to "forge[] certainty, stability, and predictability in the law. It
also reinforces confidence injudicial integrity and lays a foundation of order upon which
individuals and organizations in our society can conduct themselves." State v. Shoulderblade, 905
P.2d at 292.
However, the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent a court of last resort from
overturning precedent in limited cases:
"The general American doctrine as applied to courts of last resort is
that a court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents but will
follow the rule of law which it has established in earlier cases,
unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is
no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more
good than harm will come by departing from precedent."
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State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994), quoting John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in
Judicial Decision, 2 Vill.L.Rev. 367 (1957).
With respect to the Court of Appeals ruling in American Fork City v. Carr, the State
asserts this Court is bound by the principles of stare decisis to follow that previous ruling.
Clearly, the Utah Court of Appeals is not a court of last resort; therefore, the latitude granted in
State v. Menzies does not apply to the present case. Moreover, the defendant has failed to
articulate in what respect the American Fork City v. Carr ruling was erroneous, or was unsound
due to changing conditions. Rather, the defendant mistakenly asserts the term "voyeurism"
necessarily includes an invasion of another's right to privacy, and that the inclusion of the term
"trespassory" in the statute therefore requires a trespass to real property.
However, as discussed above, the definitions of "voyeur" or "voyeurism" do not require
the activity to be non-consensual. Furthermore, given the context in which the phrase
"trespassory voyeurism" appears, and the plain meaning of the terms "trespassory" and
"voyeurism," the State avers the phrase is sufficiently clear to inform an individual of common
intelligence what type of behavior the statute proscribes.
Therefore, because the doctrine of stare decisis states that, once a point of law is
decided, that ruling should be followed by a court of the same rank or a lower rank in subsequent
cases confronting the same legal issue, this Court should apply the Court's interpretation of
"trespassory voyeurism" contained in American Fork City v. Carr to the facts in the present case.
In so doing, this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Information, and affirm the defendant's conviction, thereby engendering uniformity and
predictability in this Court's rulings.
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CONCLUSION
The defendant's Motion to Dismiss Information was properly denied by the trial court,
and his subsequent conviction should be affirmed. The defendant had sufficient notice to know it
is impermissible to conceal one's self in a closet for the purpose of gazing upon women in various
stages of undress without having received consent to do so. The phrase "trespassory voyeurism"
is susceptible to a literal reading, and was defined in the statute with sufficient definiteness to
apprise the defendant of what conduct the statute proscribed. These definitions point to the fact a
trespass to real property is not an element of the offense "trespassory voyeurism."
However, even if this Court were to find the phrase cannot be interpreted or applied in
accord with its commonly understood meaning, the context in which "trespassory voyeurism"
appears, and the fact the defendant believed it necessary to secret himself in a closet to accomplish
his observation of the females in the tanning room, evidences the defendant was provided with
adequate notice his behavior was in violation of the Lewdness statute.
Moreover, if this Court were to determine the phrase "trespassory voyeurism" is
void for vagueness, the trial court's denial of defendant's Motion to Dismiss Information and
subsequent conviction should yet be affirmed because the defendant's acts violated other express
provisions of the Lewdness statute. Specifically, in observing females in various stages of
undress, without their consent, the defendant committed an act of lewdness "in a public place, or
under circumstances which the person should know will likely cause affront or alarm to, on, or in
the presence of another who is 14 years of age or older."
In addition, pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court should follow the ruling
established by another panel of this Court in American Fork City v. Carr. The panel in that case
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addressed and ruled upon the very point of law which the defendant presently challenges.
Inasmuch as this point of law has already been decided by a court of equal rank, this Court, in
confronting the same legal issue, should apply that previous interpretation of "trespassory
voyeurism" to the facts in the present case. In so doing, this Court should affirm the trial court's
denial of defendant's Motion to Dismiss Information, and affirm the defendant's conviction,
thereby engendering uniformity and predictability in this Court's rulings.
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